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Much philosophical progress has been made in elucidating the idea of evolutionary contingency in a 
recent re-burgeoning of the debate. However, additional progress has been impaired on three 
fronts. The first relates to its characterisation: the under-specification of various contingency claims 
has made it difficult to conceptually pinpoint the scope to which ‘contingency’ allegedly extends, as 
well as which biological forms are in contention. That is – there appears to be no systematic means 
with which to fully specify contingency claims which has led to a tendency for authors to talk past 
each other. Secondly, on the matter of evidence, recent research has focused on the evidential 
import of (genuine) convergent evolution which is taken to disconfirm the evolutionary contingency 
thesis. However, there has been a neglect of convergent evolution’s converse: ‘evolutionary 
idiosyncrasies’ or the singular evolution of certain forms, which I argue is evidentially supportive of 
evolutionary contingency. Thirdly, evolutionary contingency has often been claimed to vary in 
degrees and that the debate, itself, is a matter of ‘relative significance’ (sensu Beatty). However, 
there has been no formal method of evaluating the strength of contingency and its relative 
significance in a particular domain. In this paper, I address all three issues by (i) proposing a 
systematic means of fully specifying contingency theses with the concept of the modal range. 
Secondly, I (ii) propose an account of evolutionary idiosyncrasies, investigate the explanations for 
their occurrences, and, subsequently, spell out their significance with respect to the evolutionary 
contingency thesis. Finally, having been equipped with the evidential counterpart to convergent 
evolution, I shall (iii) sketch a likelihood framework for evaluating, precisely on the basis of a 
sequence of opposing data, the strength and relative significance of evolutionary contingency in a 
particular domain. With this in hand, the relative observations of idiosyncrasies and convergences 
can be informative of the strength and relative significance of contingency in any particular domain. 
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The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis and Evolutionary Idiosyncrasies 
1. Introduction 
The idea of evolutionary contingency has undergone a substantial resurgence in recent years with a 
number of contingency-theorists entertaining the modality of evolutionarily-derived biological 
forms. At present, there is no consensus as to what evolutionary contingency means other than to 
broadly suggest that certain evolved biological forms could have been otherwise. The suggestion is 
that there is an element of ‘chanciness’ (or some similar descriptor) to which forms would have 
actually evolved in the history of life. If evolutionary contingency were true, then as the story goes: 
had the ‘tape of life’ been replayed (from a different or the same starting point), the result would be 
an evolutionary menagerie bearing biological forms markedly different from the present ones. That 
is – instead of our ever so familiar birds, reptiles, and mammals, we would be left with forms 
‘endlessly most beautiful’… should we find ourselves fortunate enough to remain. 
The majority of recent papers have set out to propose etiological structures such as ‘casual 
dependence’, ‘path dependence’, or, ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ that supposedly account for the 
modality of evolutionarily contingent forms (e.g. Beatty, 2005; Desjardins, 2011, 2016; Powell, 2012; 
Sterelny, 2005; Turner, 2011). Certain biological forms are held to be contingent, or non-contingent, 
precisely because they are, or are not, at the end of a path dependent causal chain, for example. 
This inquisition into the relevant etiological structure for contingency is important because an 
advocate of the evolutionary contingency thesis (ECT) would assert that particular biological forms 
failed to robustly evolve because certain etiological conditions did not hold – e.g. the outcome was 
contingent because it was highly sensitive to initial conditions. However, aside from the question of 
which of the etiological structures best capture evolutionarily contingent dynamics, it is not clear 
which biological forms are meant to lack robustness and, furthermore, how far robustness is to 
extend – both of which makes conceptually grasping and empirically evaluating the thesis difficult. 
Despite the, now, frequent biological and philosophical discussions of the ECT, there has hitherto 
been no principled way of answering these two questions. Hence, there is a real need for some 
theoretical tools enabling one to fully spell out what the evolutionary contingency thesis amounts 
to. To this end, in section 2, I propose the idea of the modal range which allows contingency-
theorists to relativise contingency claims to particular, more tractable, domains of interest. 
The antithesis of the evolutionary contingency thesis – the robust view of life (RVL) – asserts 
(amongst other things) that certain biological forms are robustly realised which is to say that these 
forms are repeatedly realised across a number of evolutionary scenarios1. This view advocates that 
due to reasons of adaptive optimality or certain prevailing structural properties (sensu Sole & 
Goodwin, 2001), certain forms are disposed to repeatedly evolve within some range of evolutionary 
scenarios. There is, however, a kind of phenomenon, seldomly investigated, that speaks against such 
repeatability. These are forms that, for one reason or another, have evolved uniquely. Often peculiar 
and distinctive, these forms constitute direct counter-examples to the robust view of life in that their 
evolution has been singular within the corresponding range. But their evidential role extends further 
than acting as mere counter-examples: the reasons for their singular evolution are informative of 
the way in which evolution has failed to be robust. Accordingly, one task of the present paper is to 
                                                          
1 As such, robustness is understood, precisely, in terms of a form’s repeatability. This is legitimate as 
robustness and repeatability are two sides of the same coin. In the philosophical literature, evolutionary 
contingency has primarily referred to the robustness of form (e.g. Sterelny, 2005; Powell, 2012) whilst, in the 
biological literature, it has often been about the repeatability of form (e.g. Vermeij, 2006; Lenormand et al., 
2009). Moreover, the more repeated a form is, the more robust the form is, and vice versa. 
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explicate what these reasons are and, more generally, investigate what these uniquely evolved 
forms – evolutionary idiosyncrasies – can say about the evolutionary contingency thesis. 
Within the current evolutionary contingency literature, the bulk of the empirical evidence has been 
confined to ‘convergences’ which purportedly undermine the ECT by showing (i) that natural 
selection is ‘powerful’ enough to overcome historical encumbrances and, a fortiori, transcend 
individual phylogenetic constraints (e.g. Conway Morris, 2003; Currie, 2012a; Powell, 2012) or (ii) 
that there are structural properties (or functional constraints) of evolutionary systems that rigidly 
circumscribe the space of possible or probable forms (e.g. Sole & Goodwin, 2001; Salazar-Ciudad et 
al., 2003; McGhee, 2011; Brandon and McShea, 2010). The latter refers to physical, chemical, 
functional, dynamical, or other aspects of an evolutionary system that dispose evolution towards 
certain forms. For example, certain chemical facts true within some evolutionary system may bound 
evolution towards particular RNA configurations within that system. In contrast to convergences, 
evolutionary idiosyncrasies, as we shall see, do just the converse: they demonstrate that (i) history 
fails to be a limiting factor in the determination of form (within an evolutionary system) and/or that 
(ii) there are limited structuralities that circumscribe the space of possible or probable forms (within 
an evolutionary system). 
The term ‘evolutionary idiosyncrasies’ is non-standard and was first introduced as the title of the 
third chapter of Improbable Destinies (2017) where Jonathan Losos provides an impressive catalogue 
of various evolutionary one-offs from the duck-billed platypus to the Hawaiian Alula plant. The 
platypus possesses, amongst its suite of peculiar traits, a leathery, electro-sensitive bill conducive for 
prey-searching whilst the Alula plant embodies the odd appearance of voluminous flowers at the top 
of a long and thick stalk, leading to its being known colloquially as ‘cabbage on a stick’. However, 
what makes idiosyncrasies evolutionarily interesting is not that they possess peculiar traits per se, 
but that their evolution has been a singular event. And, it is this singular evolution that I claim is at 
odds with the robust view of life and supportive of the ECT.  
Despite the explicit intention of Improbable Destinies (2017) to evaluate the ECT, there is a 
noticeable paucity of investigation of the theoretical implications and/or philosophical significance 
of evolutionary idiosyncrasies with respect to the ECT. Nonetheless, Losos is to be commended for 
his pioneering step into a previously unrecognised area that is, as I argue in this paper, highly 
relevant for the ECT. Inspired by Losos’ lead, I consider possible explanations for the occurrence of 
idiosyncrasies and conclude that there are, exhaustively, four non-mutually-exclusive explanations 
which threaten the repeatability of form in one way or another.  
The first explanation – (i) unique environments – asserts that certain forms evolved only once 
because the environmental conditions and/or selective pressures leading to that form has been 
unique. Secondly, (ii) natural selection may have been contingent or weak such that natural selection 
responds differently to the same environmental conditions as to lack consistency in its production of 
form or, fails to repeatedly produce the most superior form for a given environment. Thirdly, there 
may be (iii) multiple solutions to the same ecological problem (also known as Functional Equivalence) 
such that there are several equally-as-adaptive solutions that can evolve by natural selection. 
Fourthly, (iv) historicities, or difference-making historical events with a low objective probability of 
occurrence, such as genetic drift events or migration events may apply diversionary tendencies 
across evolutionary scenarios such that the same form does not repeatedly arise. As I consider these 
explanations in greater depth, it will become clear that they each undermine, at least, one of two 
necessary premises of the robust view of life: what I call, environment-trait uniformity and 
environmental regularity. As such, observations of idiosyncrasies speak against a robust view of life 
and, ipso facto, are supportive of the ECT.  
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In addition, I shall formally characterise the positive evidential link between idiosyncrasies and the 
ECT in quantitative terms as to lay the groundwork for, subsequently, sketching a likelihood 
framework for evaluating the ECT in light of a given body of evidence consisting of a sequence of 
opposing data: the presence of idiosyncrasies vis-à-vis convergences. The need for the likelihood 
framework is motivated by the two common assertions that evolutionary contingency is a matter of 
‘relative significance’ (e.g. Beatty, 1995, 1997, 2006) and that evolutionary contingency can vary by 
degrees (e.g. Powell, 2012). Both assertions allegedly present methodological issues for evaluating 
the evolutionary contingency thesis (Ibid.; Beatty, 1995; Powell & Mariscal, 2015); the former in 
systematically evaluating and balancing opposing evidence, and the latter in quantifying 
contingency’s exact degree of strength. 
However, the likelihood framework proffered here kills two birds with one stone. It offers a 
powerful, objective means with which to evaluate between various ECT’s of different strengths, and 
to do so precisely on the basis of opposing evidence. The two hypotheses hitherto encountered – 
the ECT and RVL – can be understood as absolute extremes at the polar ends of a ‘contingency 
spectrum’ which contains a number of intermediary hypotheses. I submit that by way of a likelihood 
function, one can compute the probability of a body of evidence (i.e. some number of idiosyncrasies 
and convergences) conferred by any contingency hypothesis on the spectrum. In this way, the 
relative proportions of idiosyncrasies versus convergences can be informative of how evolutionarily 
contingent a particular domain is: the more idiosyncrasies there are vis-à-vis convergences, the more 
evolutionarily contingent the domain is. Hence, the methodological pessimism associated with 
evolutionary contingency varying in degree or being a ‘relative significance’ dispute can be dissolved.  
The plan is as follows: I begin by introducing the crucial notion of the modal range, so that 
contingency claims can be made precise with respect to what it means for a form to be robust or 
replicable. Following that, in section 3, I characterise evolutionary idiosyncrasies and illustrate the 
prima facie threat that they pose for the robust view of life. I, then, consider each of the four 
explanations for idiosyncrasies and explain how they each undermine the robust view of life. Moving 
on to the quantitative, in section 5, I advance two likelihood arguments (in the technical sense) to 
show that the likelihood ratio of idiosyncrasies in favour of the ECT (over the RVL) and the likelihood 
ratio of ‘convergences’ in favour of the RVL (over the ECT) are both above 1. Armed with these 
likelihood ratios which show the two phenomena’s direction of support on the contingency 
spectrum, I sketch a likelihood framework in which to evaluate the ECT given the idiosyncrasy-
convergence dichotomy. In section 6, in order to demonstrate how idiosyncrasies can differ in their 
evidential strength, I consider certain statistical parameters, and draw a distinction between two 
different kinds of idiosyncrasies: divergent idiosyncrasies (DVI) and disparate idiosyncrasies (DPI), 
where the former is stronger evidence for the ECT than the latter. Moreover, both the evidential 
strength and the evidential target (i.e. which variant of the ECT) is also dependent on two 
conceptual dimensions in which idiosyncrasies can be defined and recognised. In this regard, I 
explain how an epistemic agent can adjust these dimensions to suit their respective epistemic 
projects. 
2. The Modal Range 
Contingency claims assert varying levels of robustness or repeatability for certain biological forms 
across an array of evolutionary scenarios. But, barring some indeterminist exceptions2, most 
                                                          
2 For example, Beatty (2016, 2017) thinks that no initial differences need to exist between alternative replays 
of the tape of life in order for there to be different biological outcomes. Differences will naturally accumulate 
over time between ‘replays’ in an indeterminist universe. Contingency questions, then, can even be about the 
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contingency-theorists advocate that questions of evolutionary contingency are about the prevalence 
of biological forms amidst the variance of certain, important evolutionary conditions of epistemic 
interest. In other words, a biological form is robust if it invariantly evolves in a wide range of 
evolutionary scenarios where (inter alia) the initial conditions, geographical space, developmental 
generators, history, or, even nomological laws (may) differ between scenarios3. Some of these 
differences may be counterfactual such that what is of concern includes non-actual possibilities – for 
example, would a particular biological form still evolve in face of certain facts contrary to the actual 
world? In fact, contingency-theorists are often concerned with the evolution of forms in 
counterfactual scenarios (e.g. Beatty, 1995; Conway Morris, 2003; Beatty, 2006; Powell, 2012). As 
such, the range of scenarios need not be limited to the actual but can extend to the merely possible 
as well. For this reason, let us call the range of evolutionary scenarios under consideration for 
repeatability, the modal range.  
The concept of the modal range is crucial in that it specifies the extent to which evolution is alleged 
to be contingent. To harken back to the introduction, it answers the question of how far robustness 
is to extend. A form is more-or-less robust within a specifically-defined modal range consisting of 
some evolutionary scenarios that may differ in certain respects. Contingency claims without a modal 
range index are not fully defined and are hence, difficult to conceptualise if not empirically evaluate. 
That is – contingency claims are defined in virtue of limiting the modal space (geographically, 
nomologically, historical, etc.) in which forms are alleged to be contingent. For example, if the modal 
range contains only evolutionary scenarios on Earth, then what is of concern is evolutionary 
contingency on Earth (e.g. Conway Morris, 2003). Accordingly, then, for any question of evolutionary 
contingency, what is being asked is whether the evolutionary dynamics within some modal range are 
sufficient to result in the repeated evolution of certain forms within that range. A different modal 
range index entails a different contingency question and is likely to result in a different answer. In 
fact, the very same contingency-theorist (i.e. Vermeij, 2006) may answer contingency questions in 
the affirmative for a modal range specifying early periods of life’s history – i.e. the Cambrian – yet 
vehemently deny contingency for later periods of life due to the sentiment that certain phenomena 
including (but not limited to) phylogenetic inertia or generative entrenchment will heavily constrain 
downstream possibilities (c.f. Shanahan, 2011; Wimsatt, 2001).  
In general, the determination of the modal range is dependent on the demands of a contingency-
theorist’s epistemic project. That is – if one were interested in the evolutionary contingency of some 
particular domain, then one ought to employ the appropriate modal range index as to track the 
relevant features of that domain and not of some other domain. Accordingly, given their respective 
epistemic goals, Conway Morris (2003) ought to consider the repeatability of forms within only 
evolutionary scenarios on Earth whilst Vermeij (2006) should take care to consider repeatability 
during the relevant time periods.  
Nonetheless, due to the ambiguities afforded by a theoretically infinite number of modal range 
indices, one ought to be careful not to operationalise between two different senses of the ECT in any 
                                                          
prevalence of form amongst a series of initially identical evolutionary scenarios. (If, however, evolutionary 
scenarios are coarse-grained enough to contain ‘hidden variables’, then such a position need not oppose 
causal determinism.) 
3 Naturally, some ranges set impossibly high standards for empirical evaluation. For example, it is difficult to 
determine the repeatability of forms in systems with nomologies inconsistent with the actual world, especially 
given that our empirical observations seem to inform only actual nomology. After all, our observations are 
privy to only the actual world. This pertains to the issue known as modal empiricism. Conversely, other ranges 
may be extremely narrow as to ask uninteresting questions. 
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debate about the its truth, lest there be any argumentative cross-talk4. Moreover, when 
characterising a contingency-theorist’s view, it is imperative to refer to the modal range at hand. 
Exegetically, Gould has often been mistakenly portrayed as wholly denying the repeatability of form 
(e.g. McGhee, 2011, p. 271; see Powell & Mariscal (2015) for discussion). However, it is congruent 
with and, in fact, implied by Gould’s larger view of life that there will be some repeatability of form 
due to frozen, developmental constraints (Gould, 1977; Gould & Lewontin, 1979). To this end, Gould 
even points to a case of repeatability (2002): the repeated evolution of feeding appendages in the 
crustaceans due to certain developmental precursors (also discussed in Powell & Mariscal (2015)). 
Importantly, Gould (1989) also claims that these developmental constraints could easily have been 
otherwise and hence, there is, undoubtedly, some contingency in this respect. The concept of the 
modal range allows one to recognise the nuances of Gould’s view. That is – Gould can be understood 
as denying the contingency of evolutionary forms for modal ranges with deep developmental 
entrenchments yet asserting contingency for modal ranges without such developmental 
entrenchments (probably, modal ranges upstream in history)5. I shall, now, characterise evolutionary 
idiosyncrasies and outline the threat that they pose for the RVL. 
3. Evolutionary Idiosyncrasies and the Robust View of Life 
To my knowledge, there has not yet been any formal definition of evolutionary idiosyncrasies (or 
equivalent6) in the biological or philosophical literature. Although evolutionary oddities and peculiar 
biological forms are often cited (usually, to convey a sense of awe), a lack of an explicit formulation 
of this class of phenomena in the literature is not entirely surprising given that, historically, little 
theoretical significance has been attributed to them. However, as I argue that the existence of 
uniquely evolved biological forms in nature has considerable bearing to the ECT, this class of 
phenomena has sufficient theoretical significance to merit explicit formulation:  
Evolutionary Idiosyncrasies: biological forms that are uniquely evolved (within some modal 
range7) 
As such, evolutionary idiosyncrasies are defined by their singular evolution and not by the form’s 
uniqueness, per se. That is – there can be multiple instantiations of an idiosyncrasy: say, multiple 
platypus individuals, for example. The singular evolution of a form and its uniqueness are distinct 
notions and need not co-vary. Just as convergent evolution is defined by their having independent 
bouts of evolution rather than whether there are multiple instances of the form at hand, 
evolutionary idiosyncrasies (though uniquely evolved) can be multiply instantiated all the same. 
Conversely, if a form is unique, per se, in that it fails to be instantiated elsewhere in the modal range, 
it does not follow that the form is also an idiosyncrasy since the form may have evolved multiple 
times but has been, subsequently, reduced to a single instantiation. All in all, what matters is 
whether a form has independently evolved more than once as to be informative of the evolutionary 
dynamics, relevant to contingency, of a domain. 
                                                          
4 There are, of course, some modal range indices that are ‘nested’ within other indices such that any 
disagreement may not necessarily be argumentative cross-talk. 
5 Or to use Sterelny’s (2005) term, Gould may be asserting ‘conditional inevitability’ whereby the condition is 
the developmental constraints: certain forms necessarily follow when those constraints are present. 
6 The closest, extant concepts are ‘evolutionary novelties’ and ‘apomorphies’ (c.f. Pigliucci, 2008; Hennig, 
1966) – both of which do not capture a sense of singularity in a form’s evolution. 
7 Like the ECT, evolutionary idiosyncrasies can also vary by being indexed to different modal ranges. However, 
what matters in considering their evidential import is whether this index (of time/space/possibility/etc.) is 
appropriate to capture an adequate sample size of alternative histories in order to infer certain propositions 
about the way evolution works. See ensuing discussion on the scope of uniqueness. 
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But even then, a caveat is in order: there are two conceptual complications with defining and 
recognising evolutionary idiosyncrasies. The first pertains to what it is that is supposed to be 
uniquely evolved. In other words, what is the subject of idiosyncrasy? When it is said that a biological 
form8 has uniquely evolved, is one referring to a particular trait like an electro-sensitive leathery bill, 
a particular species like the Hawaiian Alula, or, even a particular biological population? A clear 
denotation of the subject of idiosyncrasy is required before its evolution can be even precluded 
elsewhere. 
Furthermore, the determination of the subject of idiosyncrasy may also be plagued by the so-called 
grain issue. Just as almost always encountered with convergence, whether two forms are alike or 
different depends on the grain of the form’s description (Sterelny, 2005; Currie, 2012b; Powell, 
2012). For example, some coarse-grained traits like predator avoidance is so broad as to have, 
undoubtedly, evolved across several evolutionary lineages. Yet, at the same time, a finer-grained 
trait – say camouflage – is likely to be less ubiquitous. An even finer-grained trait like a specific 
colour pattern of camouflage would be even less common. In general, coarse-grained resolutions 
yield fewer idiosyncrasies than fine-grained resolutions, ceterus paribus. Consequently, the number 
of idiosyncrasies (or whether there are any idiosyncrasies at all) appear to be a matter arbitrarily 
dependent on grain specification. 
But note that the determination of the subject of idiosyncrasy and the grain of analysis, though 
related, are distinct. It is just that determining the subject of idiosyncrasy will involve taking a stand 
on the level of grain to invoke. This is because possible subjects of idiosyncrasy (i.e. traits, species, 
populations, etc.) are often amenable to different descriptions due to differences in resolution. For 
example, the fastest animal on Earth, the peregrine falcon possesses many traits. There is the 
coarse-grained trait of ‘being able to fly’, a finer-grained trait of ‘having wings’, and, an even finer-
grained trait of having ‘pointed, stiff-feathered wings’. Yet, presumably, only the lattermost is a 
strong candidate for an idiosyncrasy.  A different trait – say a pointed, loose-feathered wing – is 
roughly at the same level of grain as the peregrine falcon’s stiff-feathered wing, but it is clearly a 
different subject of idiosyncrasy which may or may not be uniquely evolved. However, settling on 
any one of these traits to be the subject of idiosyncrasy will, at the same time, answer the question 
of grain: for example, the trait of having ‘pointed, stiff-feathered wings’ will simply have a, fine-
grained, description at that level. Graining is merely a property of a subject of an idiosyncrasy. The 
point is that insofar as a subject of idiosyncrasy has been determined, the grain of analysis will also 
be given. The election of the grain is important only insofar as it is part and parcel of specifying the 
subject of idiosyncrasy. 
Secondly, there is the question of the scope of uniqueness. Forms are idiosyncratic if and only if they 
are uniquely evolved, but what does it take to be uniquely evolved? Let us say that Form A is 
uniquely evolved if and only if the same form has not evolved elsewhere. But, then, what does 
‘elsewhere’ refer to? Are the forms to be considered ones found only on Earth or found beyond? 
Similarly, are forms in the ancient past or distant future to be considered? The widening of scope 
makes it less likely for any particular form to be uniquely evolved whilst narrowing the scope 
improves its chances. 
These two complications present epistemic challenges in defining and recognising idiosyncrasies, but 
they do not undermine the concept, per se. That is – insofar as the subject of idiosyncrasy (including 
the grain of analysis), and the scope of uniqueness are specified, then there is very much a given 
                                                          
8 I mean ‘form’ in a very loose sense as to encompass almost any biological outcome of interest. As we shall 
see, this laissez-faire attitude is important for a contingency-theorist’s framing of their epistemic project.  
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number of idiosyncrasies in the world. For a ‘theory of idiosyncrasies’ then, it might be said that 
there are two conceptual dimensions in need of specification before idiosyncrasies are fully defined 
and thus, can be recognised. But the supposed conundrum is figuring out how, exactly, to specify 
these dimensions.  
At this time, I respond briefly by pointing out that the specification of the subject of idiosyncrasy and 
the scope of uniqueness are wholly relative to the respective goals of individual epistemic agents 
and the nature of propositions they intend to make. This is because an alteration of either dimension 
will result in a shift of the evidential target of idiosyncrasies. For example, altering the scope of 
uniqueness shifts the variant of the ECT that is supported by idiosyncrasies since idiosyncrasies are 
now indicative of evolutionary singularity in a different modal range. That is – by altering the scope 
of uniqueness, idiosyncrasies are bouts of singular evolution in face of a different set of variances 
amongst evolutionary scenarios: perhaps, it is no longer singularity amongst scenarios with varying 
nomologies but varying histories. The independent variable(s) of the array has changed. 
Recall that it is crucial in any debate about the contingency of evolution for the participants to hold 
fixed the modal range in which evolution is alleged to be contingent, lest there be argumentative 
cross-talk. So, suppose a contingency-theorist was interested in the evolutionary contingency of the 
terrestrial domain (i.e. on Earth). In this case, idiosyncrasies are evidentially relevant only if they are 
informative of the evolutionary dynamics of that domain. Any different – say if the scope of 
uniqueness of idiosyncrasies was extended to only one continent – then idiosyncrasies fail to be 
informative of the evolutionary dynamics (e.g. the power of natural selection or the existence of 
certain structuralities) present on Earth (barring extrapolation from continent to planet). As such, 
idiosyncrasies would not tell us about the wholesale repeatability of form on Earth, but only on one 
continent. Accordingly, if one were interested in the power of natural selection on Earth, then an 
Earth-wide scope of uniqueness would be appropriate. In other words, it is epistemically imperative 
that the scope of uniqueness of idiosyncrasies correspond to the modal range of the ECT variant in 
question. In a return to the topic of differential evidence in section 6, we shall see that an alteration 
of the subject of idiosyncrasy also shifts the evidential target. In general, taking a position on either 
of the two dimensions will not only affect the number of idiosyncrasies recognised but alter their 
evidential implications as well. Hence, the specification of the two conceptual dimensions depends 
on the epistemic demands of a contingency-theorist’s project.  
In Improbable Destinies (2017), Losos offers many examples of idiosyncrasies but, perhaps, most 
notable is the semi-aquatic duck-billed platypus, found only in eastern Australia. The platypus’ 
unique evolution is exemplified by the amalgamation of several peculiar features: its mammalian 
egg-laying, venomous spur, leathery bill, and prey-sensing electroreceptors. Losos’ point is that, as a 
whole, there has been no other species like the platypus9. 
There is tension between such cases of evolutionary idiosyncrasies and the robust view of life: if 
biological forms were robust in their evolution, then it would be striking that idiosyncratic forms like 
that of the platypus did not evolve more than once. This is because the robust view of life stipulates 
that the same evolutionary outcomes will repeatedly evolve within some modal range whilst 
                                                          
9 Depending on the scope of uniqueness, the platypus may be an inapt example of an evolutionary 
idiosyncrasy as there are closely-related and similar, albeit extinct, species such as the Obdurodon or 
Ornithorhynchus. Perhaps, it was the common ancestor to these three species that was the idiosyncrasy. 
Nonetheless, regardless of any difficulty in pinpointing idiosyncrasies, the conceptual point for their 
significance still stands. 
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idiosyncrasies assert, precisely, that there has been singular evolution within that modal range. 
Ceterus paribus, these are contradictory assertations.  
The source of the tension stems from the fact that the robust view of life explains, in part, such 
repeatability by appealing to there being certain, definite environment-trait dyads: given any one 
environment, there is necessarily a given trait10. In other words, the robust view of life requires that 
certain evolutionary conditions necessarily lead to particular evolutionary outcomes11. This is either 
manifested by (i) a Hard Adaptationist sense of natural selection (Amundson, 1994) that dictates 
that certain environmental pressures are met with the most superior solution (e.g. McGhee 2011, 
Powell 2012), or, (ii) that non-selective nomological aspects or the so-called structuralities of the 
environment dispose one particular outcome (e.g. McShea, 1994; Sole & Goodwin, 2001; Stayton 
2008; Brandon and McShea, 2010). But this environment-trait uniformity alone is not enough for 
robust repeatability since it is possible for same evolutionary conditions to fail to repeatedly exist 
within the modal range.  
Accordingly, the remaining half of the explanation for robust repeatability is that there is, in fact, 
environmental regularity such that there are multiple instances of the same evolutionary 
environment within the modal range12. Putting these two parts together, the robust view of life says 
that a form, F1, is repeatedly realised in some modal range (say, within all Earth-like planets in the 
universe at all times) because (i) environment E1 necessarily gives rise to form F1 due to some 
evolutionary force (e.g. selection or drift), and (ii) environment E1 can be widely found on Earth-like 
planets in the universe. Environment-trait uniformity and environmental regularity are two 
necessary premises (amongst others) that are required of the robust view of life in order to assert 
the repeatability of form. If, for instance, there was no environmental regularity within the modal 
range concerned then, despite the power of natural selection or functional constraints to dispose 
forms in certain environments, there would nonetheless be no repetition of form13. Alternatively, if 
certain environments do not guarantee particular forms, then despite an abundance of similar 
environments, the same form need not repeatedly result. 
Accordingly, at a more fundamental level of analysis, the tension exists because observations of 
idiosyncrasies threaten the truth of the two premises of a robust view of life. That is – observations 
of idiosyncrasies provide reasons to dissolve the classical environment-trait dyad or reject that there 
are alternative histories with similar evolutionary conditions within the modal range. This is because 
the individual explanations for idiosyncrasies, themselves, logically contradict environment-trait 
                                                          
10 As a note aside, it is, sometimes, tricky to define the environment-trait dyad. As per Brandon (1990), 
environments are always relative to an organism. So, whilst two organisms may seem to occupy the same 
environment, they may nonetheless be exposed to subtle differences in environmental pressures. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for this reminder. 
11 Historically, this idea has had strong support by evolutionary biologists due, in part, to a battery of statistical 
tests confirming significant correlation between environment and phenotype for individual taxons (e.g. 
Gittleman, 1981; Felsenstein, 1985; Felsenstein, 2004; Hansen et al., 2008). However, Kluge (2005) argues that 
little can be inferred from this correlation. The correlation has also been met with much push-back from claims 
cautioning an overshoot of its implications (e.g. environment-trait correlation does not show adaptationism), 
stemming from the ‘internalists’ and the like. 
12 Millstein (2000) has made the point that even in the face of natural selection, the macroevolutionary pattern 
will be stochastic if lineages were driven by a wide array of selective pressures that are unrelated or, at least, 
random with respect to each other. Brandon and McShea (2010) made a similar point. 
13 Logically, there is one exception whereby the same form can answer many environmental demands. This is 
the converse of the multiple solutions to the same ecological problem and may be exhibited by phenomena 
such as ‘environmental plasticity’. However, as we shall see, if the MST is true, then this exception cannot 
apply. 
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uniformity and/or environmental regularity. To see this, let us now consider the four explanations in 
turn.  
4. Explanations for Evolutionary Idiosyncrasies  
4.1 Unique Environments 
One obvious explanation for occurrences of idiosyncrasies is that the evolutionary environment in 
which an idiosyncrasy evolved was unique and so, it was no surprise that the idiosyncrasy evolved 
only once. In other words, the set of conditions that led to the evolution of an idiosyncrasy failed to 
be present elsewhere (within the modal range) such that the form, supposedly guaranteed by the 
environment, did not evolve elsewhere (within the modal range). Since an evolutionary environment 
(sensu lato14) may be manifested by the set of selective pressures or non-selective nomological 
properties (i.e. structuralities sensu Sole & Goodwin), this could mean that the selective pressures 
were unique such that natural selection did not yield a similar form elsewhere or that the 
structuralities of the environment were unique such that a similar form did not result elsewhere15. 
(Or even that the amalgamation of both selective pressures and structuralities were unique.) In 
essence, a unique environment presents evolutionary conditions, not found elsewhere within the 
modal range, with which evolutionary forces are to operate. And so, it is no surprise that the result 
of these forces is a form that evolved only once within the modal range. Returning to the platypus 
example, perhaps, its evolution was one-off because the environmental conditions conducive to its 
evolution failed to be present elsewhere.  
All in all, unique environments suffice to explain the occurrence of idiosyncrasies, but the existence 
of unique environments is logically opposed to the environmental regularity premise of the robust 
view of life. For obvious reasons, there cannot be both environmental regularity (i.e. more than one 
instance of the same environment) and a unique environment within a modal range. And so, if 
unique environments are to explain the occurrence of an idiosyncrasy within a modal range, then 
the robust view of life is false for that modal range.  
Empirically, this sort of explanation is compelling. A recent review paper by Stuart et al. (2017) 
points outs that deviations from the expectation of ‘convergences’ is often a result of subtle 
environmental heterogeneity or subtle differences between environments. Other studies have a 
similar conclusion (e.g. Landry et al., 2007; Matthews et al. 2007; Moore et al., 2016). But this is not 
the only explanation for occurrences of idiosyncrasies.  
4.2 Weak or Contingent Natural Selection 
Given that the natural habitat of the platypus (e.g. streams and ponds) appears to be ubiquitous on 
Earth (Losos, 2017, p. 88), Losos wonders why forms similar to the platypus could not be found 
elsewhere other than eastern Australia. In other words, for Losos, the evolutionary environment for 
the platypus is clearly not unique. His first gesture at resolving this curiosity is to point to the 
possibility that natural selection could be limited in its ability to generate the same form. That is – 
                                                          
14 The sense of ‘evolutionary environments’ vary widely in the philosophical and biological literature. My 
operationalisation of it here is in contrast to, for example, Losos’ (2011) more restrictive sense where an 
evolutionary environment comprises solely of selective pressures without inclusion of any structuralities. 
15 As we know from Lewontin (1983), organisms are often part of the environment and can constitute as 
selective pressures in an environment. Thus, an environment may be unique or fail to be unique because of 
the constellation of biotic creatures present. So, the phenomenon of competitive exclusion can be subsumed 
under the explanation of unique environments: a form did not repeatedly evolve (in an initially unique 
environment) because a similar form has already taken its place, thereby changing the selective environment. 
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either natural selection is weak or contingent (he uses the word “unpredictable” in lieu of 
contingent16). If natural selection were weak in the sense that it does not always succeed in resulting 
in the most superior solution, then identical evolutionary environments need not result in the same 
biological form under natural selection’s crank. For the advocate of the robust view of life, optimality 
reasons can explain why certain forms are robust (i.e. forms are robust because they are adaptive 
peaks) but such reasons must be coupled by some mechanism (i.e. hill climbing mechanism) that 
sufficiently ensures the evolution of the superior trait. Without the latter – if natural selection were 
‘weak’ – then there is no reason to think that a trait will be robustly realised even if the trait in 
question were most superior.  
As for Losos’ claim that idiosyncrasies can be explained by natural selection that is ‘contingent’, it is 
not clear what is exactly meant by this though one may surmise given his reference to random 
mutation and mutational order. Perhaps, natural selection is contingent in that natural selection is 
dependent on low probability events (often referred to as ‘chancy’ or ‘stochastic’ events) that 
generate the suite of genetic material made available and their ordering, like random mutation and 
mutational ordering (Mani and Clarke, 1990), respectively. But if natural selection is contingent in 
this sense, then natural selection cannot guarantee a particular outcome given certain evolutionary 
environments; different outcomes may result depending on chancy precedents.  
Accordingly, idiosyncrasies can occur despite any environmental regularity because natural selection 
failed to guarantee environment-trait uniformity due to either (i) selection’s limited ability to 
produce the most superior form or (ii) the chancy availability of genetic variance with which 
selection is dependent upon. Either way, an explanation of idiosyncrasy invoking weak or contingent 
natural selection dissolves the environment-trait dyad since certain evolutionary environments fail 
to guarantee particular outcomes.  
But notice that explanations invoking the weakness or contingency of natural selection nonetheless 
ultimately rely on historical events. As above, natural selection is weak only because it at the mercy 
of past phylogenetic constraints and other historicities (c.f. Gould and Lewontin, 1979). Likewise, 
natural selection is contingent only because it is dependent on the occurrence of prior historical 
events (e.g. random mutation) that supposedly lack counterfactual robustness. But this is no cause 
for concern for, as we shall see, the various explanations for idiosyncrasies are not mutually-
exclusive and may work in tandem to undermine the RVL. 
Furthermore, if what is meant by natural selection being contingent is that it fails to guarantee a 
particular outcome given certain environmental conditions, then there appears to be yet another 
way in which natural selection is contingent. This is because certain environmental conditions may 
leave open a choice of equally-as-effective design solutions (Arnold, 1983; Beatty, 2008). That is – on 
the basis of adaptive value alone, the solutions may be more-or-less indistinguishable from one 
another. Thus, natural selection cannot possibly favour one solution over another (whichever 
solution is reached must be due to non-adaptive factors). There may be multiple (equally adaptive) 
solutions to the same ecological problem – let us call this the Multiply Soluble Thesis (MST). 
4.3 Multiple Solutions to the Same Ecological Problem 
Darwin brushed past this very idea in considering the range of the orchid’s fertilisation mechanisms 
(1862). He noted that orchid fertilisation was facilitated by insects, but such a mechanism was, in 
                                                          
16 Exegetically, it does not appear that Losos refers to ‘unpredictability’ in the epistemic sense. In order to 
avoid conflation with a distinct, epistemological notion about what one can know about natural selection, I 
shall take Losos as referring to the ‘contingency’ of natural selection in its ability to yield robust forms. 
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principle, liable to lead to inbreeding which would incur substantial adverse fitness effects over time 
(Ibid.) – modern studies confirm this (e.g. Smithson, 2006). At the same time, theoretical 
considerations stipulate that orchid fitness would increase by maximising reproduction. Thus, orchid 
fertilisation may be said to have (at least) two primary ecological problems: the maximisation of 
reproduction by cross-pollination and the avoidance of inbreeding.  
But Darwin further noted that the various species of orchids were, for all intents and purposes, 
subjected to identical environments since they were open to visitation by the very same 
complement of insect species17. Yet orchids showed substantial diversity in their morphology in 
enlisting insects for cross-pollination. In the case of the Orchis mascula, there are two adhesive sacs 
of pollen masses suspended by thin elastic threads. The nectary of the Orchis mascula was in such a 
way that when an insect attempts to feed, it would undoubtedly brush past these sacs of pollen, 
thereby attaching the sacs to themselves, and, subsequently, bring pollen to its next destination 
(another Orchis mascula, perhaps). The Catasetum saccatum, on the other hand, violently launches 
pollen sacs downwards at insects when certain, elaborate triggers are activated. The point is that 
orchids exhibited multiple solutions to the same ecological problems18. In the modern ecological 
literature, this has been come to be known as the many-to-one mapping of form to function (e.g. 
Alfaro et al., 2004; Wainright et al., 2005; Thompson et al. 2017).  
Losos too recognizes the idea of the MST and considers it as a candidate explanation for 
idiosyncrasies and, in particular, the unique evolution of the platypus. Although the environmental 
conditions in eastern Australia that gave rise to the platypus may be present elsewhere on Earth, the 
range of solutions may ultimately be underdetermined by the environmental conditions. That is – 
perhaps, other species with morphology distinct from the platypus could answer the same ecological 
demands to that of the platypus. And hence, the same form need not repeatedly evolve in the same 
environments. In this way, the environment-trait dyad is once again broken such that particular 
outcomes are no longer guaranteed by certain environments. Idiosyncrasies that are explained by 
the MST are opposed to the robust view of life in virtue of undermining environment-trait 
uniformity.  
In demonstrating the MST, there are a host of empirical cases that document significant 
morphological diversity for the same function. For instance, Young et al. (2009) studied how a many-
to-one mapping of form to function can lead to morphological diversity in shrews generating the 
same amount of jaw force. Similarly, the canonical stickleback studies (e.g. Wainright et al., 2005; 
Thompson et al., 2017) illustrate that the MST can apply selectively to feeding structures. These 
studies agree that the lower jaw structure of the threespine stickleback has exhibited a strong linear 
relationship with its function (i.e. lever ratio) or a one-to-one mapping of form to function. In other 
words, MST is false for the lower jaw structure. However, two other structures of the threespine 
stickleback, the epaxial-buccal cavity and 4-bar structure show significant functional equivalence in 
their respective functions (as measured by ‘suction index’ or ‘kinematic transmission’). Thompson et 
al. (2017) further demonstrated that because of a many-to-one mapping of form to function, there 
                                                          
17 Of course, Darwin may have been operating with a coarse-grained 19th century lens here. But this does not 
take away from the example’s point. 
18 Perhaps, Darwin’s lens might have been too coarse, after all. Finer-grained lenses might lead one to think 
that the ecological problems encountered by the Orchis mascula and Catasetum saccatum are not the same. 
Since the two species must evolve a means of avoiding inbreeding, they might do well to evolve different 
morphology as to specialise in different insect species. The salient question for whether orchids do, in fact, 
share the same ecological problems is: are the different orchid species truly visited by the same complement 
of insects? 
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was less repeated evolution of the latter two structures19. Putting aside methodological and grain 
issues, these studies extend plausibility to the MST.  
4.4 Historicities 
It is true that an explanation for idiosyncrasies based on the MST undermines the robust view of life 
by dissolving the environment-trait dyad. However, logically-speaking, the MST per se is not enough 
to entail the unique evolution of a form. Just as there is no positive reason to think that any one 
particular form will repeatedly evolve when there are equally adaptive alternatives (in design space), 
there is no positive reason to think that a different solution will arise at every evolutionary bout 
even when there are alternatives. Rather, there must be some reason for why it is that the same 
design solution was not elected even in the presence of alternatives.  
This brings us to the fourth explanation for idiosyncrasies: difference-making historical events with 
low objective chance of occurrence. Let us call this historicities20. Even if there were several equally-
adaptive solutions to the same ecological problem, whichever form natural selection or genetic drift 
produces depend upon certain preceding historical events like random mutations or their ordering. 
For example, if the necessary complement of genetic variation for the evolution of wings did not 
arise through random mutation then there can be no such evolution of wings. In this way, low 
probability historical events such as historicities limit the directionality of an evolutionary 
population’s movement through adaptive space. Alternatively, historical factors may place an 
evolutionary population initially closer to one peak than another and thereby, increasing its 
probability of climbing the closer peak.  
Historicities relevant to the ECT encompass many phenomena and can be biological or non-
biological. Biological historicities include (inter alia) random mutation, mutational order, migration 
events, and phylogenetic constraints due to ancestry. Certain migration events with low objective 
chance of occurrence such as ones prompted by volcanic eruption may result in gene flow into a 
population with significant outcome difference making effects. In this regard, the empirical literature 
has demonstrated that differential gene flow due to differential migration resulted in significant 
phenotypic divergences of the lake-stream stickleback (Hendry and Taylor, 2004) and, indeed, other 
organisms (Hendry, 2017).  
Famously due to Gould (1989), one commonly discussed historicity in the contingency literature has 
been historical events that severely circumscribe downstream outcomes via the generation of 
phylogenetic constraints. Indeed, one principal argument in Wonderful Life (1989) was that the 
survivors of Cambrian extinction could have easily been otherwise such that the phylogenetic 
constraints (e.g. bauplan) of our vertebrate clade, which descended from the reigning survivors of a 
supposedly indeterminate sampling event (i.e. Cambrian Extinction), had a low objective probability 
of occurrence. According to Gould (Ibid.), extant vertebrates could easily have had different body 
plans and hence, be markedly different. The thrust of this argument comes from the low objective 
probabilities of the survival events during the Cambrian such that replaying the Cambrian period 
would undoubtedly or, more accurately, probably result in a different surviving menagerie. In 
general, on account of the low probability of phylogenetic events, evolutionary systems within a 
modal range are probable to have different phylogenetic constraints. This is because it is, by 
definition, relatively improbable for the same low probability phylogenetic event to occur in more 
                                                          
19 Their study used the term ‘parallelism’ but their definition did not have encompass a developmental 
component. So, for consistency, I take it they meant ‘repeated evolution’ or ‘convergence’, more broadly. 
20 I follow Desjardins’ terminology (2016).   
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than one evolutionary system. Thus, there is a probabilistic expectation that different evolutionary 
systems are to have different phylogenetic constraints. And, for this reason, idiosyncrasies may 
result since the form is improbable to evolve again in alternative evolutionary systems.  
Non-biological events include (inter alia) asteroid impacts, global climate change, and certain 
perturbations stemming from outside the evolutionary system. Despite their non-biological nature, 
the key is that these historical events are difference-making to the evolutionary outcome and have a 
low objective probability of occurrence – e.g. they are ‘chancy’, ‘stochastic’, or ‘random’. Without 
the latter, it is possible for the same historical events to occur ubiquitously within a modal range as 
for the same forms to repeatedly evolve.  
An explanation of idiosyncrasies founded in historicities can undermine the environment-trait 
uniformity premise of the robust view of life through its interaction with natural selection: an 
environment fails to guarantee a specific form because certain historicities such as random mutation 
limited natural selection. Alternatively, the environmental regularity premise can be undermined by 
historicities, such as asteroid impacts or volcanic eruptions, that occur in some but not all 
environments, thereby introducing differences amongst environments in a modal range. That is – 
historicities may, sometimes, produce unique environments within a modal range (though they need 
not21). In the former case, natural selection is limited in virtue of historicities (i.e. mutation events) 
whilst in the latter, an environment is unique due to historicities (i.e. asteroid impact or volcanic 
eruption). 
Having considered the four explanations for idiosyncrasies, it is helpful to consider their effects in 
terms of Simpson’s (1944) adaptive landscape metaphor (not to be confused with Wright’s earlier 
adaptive landscape of gene frequencies). Recall that the MST asserts that there are multiple equally-
as-adaptive solutions to the same environmental problem. This can be understood as the prevalence 
of several equally-as-high peaks on the adaptive landscape22. So, one explanation for the occurrence 
of idiosyncrasies is that there were several adaptive peaks, each encompassing a distinct solution, on 
the landscape.  
However, whichever peak is sought can highly depend on historical factors: either those that 
determined the starting conditions on the adaptive landscape or those that influence the 
directionality of movement (e.g. the generation of genetic variation upon which natural selection 
can act) across the adaptive landscape. On the adaptive landscape, if natural selection is, indeed, 
weak or contingent, then there is a limitation in the directionality of movement across the 
topographical space. In other words, the supposed hill-climbing mechanism is limited. But again, 
such a limitation would be ultimately due to historical events such as random mutation or drift 
events.  
Lastly, the topography of an adaptive landscape is, itself, a manifestation of the environment. That is 
– the ridges and contours are determined by the environmental conditions. Hence, unique 
topographies correspond to unique environments. A unique environment can, then, be understood 
to provide a unique topography on which evolutionary forces act. All in all, the adaptive landscape 
metaphor is meant to emphasise that the four explanations for idiosyncrasies are not mutually-
                                                          
21 Historicities and unique environments are distinct concepts although they often come hand-in-hand (they 
are not mutually-exclusive, after all). As already mentioned, historicities can constitute as chance events in 
migration or extinction resulting in differential genetic availability and, subsequently, idiosyncrasies, without 
ever producing a unique environment. 
22 Notice that as the number of equally-as-high peaks reaches infinity, it is akin to the adaptive landscape being 
absolutely ‘flat’ whereby genetic drift would completely take over. 
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exclusive and may, sometimes, work in tandem to explain particular bouts of idiosyncrasies: even if 
there are many peaks, whichever adaptive solution is sought can depend on the details of natural 
selection and/or historical factors. Likewise, the determination of the topography (i.e. environment), 
itself, is sometimes dependent on the historicities. 
5. The Likelihood Framework and the Contingency Spectrum  
Thus far, I have argued that each of the four explanations of idiosyncrasies undermine at least one of 
two necessary premises for the robust view of life and, as such, idiosyncrasies are evidence against 
the robust view of life. Moreover, since the RVL and ECT are contradictory views, evolutionary 
idiosyncrasies also serve as evidence for the ECT. But how might we invoke idiosyncrasies as 
evidence in further analyses?  
In this section, I sketch a likelihood framework in which to evaluate contingency hypotheses in light 
of a body of evidence. More specifically, I model the idiosyncrasy-convergence dichotomy as 
Bernoulli processes and I define a likelihood function that will yield, from a given a set of data (i.e. 
observations of idiosyncrasies vis-à-vis convergences), a likelihood distribution for all of the 
hypotheses on the ‘contingency spectrum’. In other words, for any given set of observations 
consisting of some number of idiosyncrasies and some number of convergences, one can compute 
the likelihood (in the technical sense) of various hypotheses that differ in the degree of contingency 
that they assert. Subsequently, one can also determine which hypothesis has the maximum 
likelihood (via maximum likelihood estimation methods23). That is – even if a number of contingency 
hypotheses is consistent with the data, there will nonetheless be one hypothesis that confers the 
greatest probability on the data. And, according to the Law of Likelihood (see later), this hypothesis 
is one that is best evidentially supported by the data.  
For the proponents of Bayesianism, one can further derive the posterior probability mass function 
(pmf) by applying this likelihood function to some appropriate prior distribution. Quite powerfully, 
this would, then, yield the conditional probability of any ECT hypothesis in light of the evidence; 
however, this Bayesian inference would nonetheless be severely limited by the determination of the 
priors (where uniformity may not be appropriate) and the quality/quantity of the data24. Regardless, 
the merit of the likelihood function stands on its own and is found in the function’s ability to 
produce different likelihoods for a range of hypotheses that correspondingly differ in their assertion 
of the degree of contingency for some modal range or domain.  
Evolutionary contingency is said to vary in degrees (e.g. Beatty, 1995; Beatty, 2006; Powell, 2012; 
Turner, 2011). By that, it is meant that different domains may exhibit different levels of evolutionary 
contingency; there may be some domains where contingency reigns strongly whilst there may be 
other domains where robustness is the norm. In domains where contingency is strong, biological 
forms are less repeatable or less robust than in domains where contingency is weak. Accordingly, I 
submit that we can understand the RVL and ECT as extremes on the polar ends of a contingency 
spectrum with an infinite number of intermediary hypothesis in the middle (see diagram). 
                                                          
23 In this case, there is (fortunately) a closed-form analytic solution available since I am modelling the 
‘contingency trials’ as Bernoulli processes: e.g. # of idiosyncrasies/total observations. 
24 There is a litany of papers on this issue across various disciplines. So, I shall not rehearse the points here. See 
Howson & Urbach (1989) for what I take to be the definitive guide on Bayesianism. 
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Diagram 1. Contingency Spectrum 
Recall that the ECT denies that there is any repeatability within a modal range such that all forms 
within that range are idiosyncrasies. Conversely, the RVL says that there is repeatability and that 
there are no idiosyncrasies at all. Both of these hypotheses are radical in the degree of contingency 
they assert and no actual contingency-theorist advocates either of them. Rather, the more plausible 
hypotheses lie in the intermediate, and it is just that contingency-theorists disagree on which of the 
intermediary hypotheses is true. As mentioned, fortunately, likelihood functions provide a means of 
evaluating between the various hypotheses on the spectrum – or, in other words, evaluating the 
strength of contingency – given some appropriate data. But what is considered appropriate data, 
and, furthermore, what would the data be supportive of?  
The previous section showed that evolutionary idiosyncrasies are evidence against the RVL and are 
evidence for the ECT. It seems that idiosyncrasies point towards the ECT. However, there is a 
different kind of observation that seems to point in exactly the opposite direction. These are 
observations of ‘convergences’ which have had much discussion in the contingency literature. 
Roughly put, convergences are the repeated evolution of the same form from sufficiently 
independent taxa/species/lineages/starting points25. I shall reconstruct these points in probabilistic 
terms as to adhere with the likelihood framework. I do this by advancing two likelihood arguments 
to show that ‘idiosyncrasies’ evidentially favour the ECT (over the RVL), and ‘convergences’ 
evidentially favour the RVL (over the ECT). In other words, I shall show that (i) the probability of 
idiosyncrasies given the ECT is higher than the probability of idiosyncrasies given the robust view of 
life, and (ii) the probability of convergences given the RVL is higher than the probability of 
convergences given the ECT.  
The first argument can be depicted in the terms of comparative likelihoods, where ‘IDIO’ refers to 
observations of evolutionary idiosyncrasies and ‘RVL’ refers to the robust view of life:  
(IE1) Pr (IDIO | ECT) > Pr (IDIO | RVL)  
If the left-hand term is greater than the right-hand term, then the likelihood ratio in favour of the 
ECT is above 1. Then, according to Hacking’s (1965) ‘Law of Likelihood’ or, in the form more common 
today (i.e. Sober, 2008), observations of idiosyncrasies count as evidence for the ECT (over the RVL): 
                                                          
25 There are numerous discussions on what it takes to be sufficiently independent. See Currie (2012b), Powell 
(2012), Powell and Mariscal (2014), and Pearce (2012). Of considerable importance is the ‘parallelism-
convergence distinction’ that alleges that some commonly cited instances of ‘convergences’ are actually 
instances of parallel evolution which fail to inform the contingency debate on account of their superficial 
independence. Rather, ‘genuine convergent evolution’ ought to be our evidence (Powell, 2012; Powell and 
Mariscal, 2014.) 
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Law of Likelihood26: An observation O evidentially supports (is in favour of) H1 over H2 if and 
only if Pr (O|H1) > Pr (O|H2) (Sober, 2008)  
Evolutionary idiosyncrasies, as defined, are biological forms that have uniquely evolved such that 
they have not evolved elsewhere within the modal range. If the ECT were true of some modal range 
such that there is little or no repeatability within that range, it would not be a surprise that there are 
idiosyncrasies within that modal range. However, if the RVL were true such that there is much 
repeatability, then the existence of idiosyncrasies which, by definition, defy repeatability would be a 
surprise. Therefore, (IE1) is true, and idiosyncrasies favour the ECT over the RVL.  
On the other hand, convergences or the independent origination of the same form would not be a 
surprise if the RVL were true. This is because the RVL stipulates that there are cases of repeated 
evolution of the same form within a modal range. However, if the ECT were true such that there was 
little or no repetition of form, then one would not expect convergences. So, IE2 is also true such that 
convergences favour the RVL over the ECT:  
(IE2) Pr (CONV|RVL) > Pr (CONV |ECT)   [‘CONV’ refers to convergences]  
It is now clear which ends of the contingency spectrum, these two phenomena point towards. 
Observations of idiosyncrasies push us towards the right of the contingency spectrum (viz. towards 
the ECT), and observations of convergences should push us towards the left of the contingency 
spectrum (viz. towards the RVL)27. Now, suppose that one were interested in the degree of 
contingency (and, a fortiori, the truth of contingency) in some domain, and had observed some 
number of idiosyncrasies and some number of convergences. In this case, one might ask for the 
comparative evidential support, by the data observed, for all of the hypotheses on the contingency 
spectrum. And, to answer this question, one would need to compute the likelihood of every 
hypothesis given the data (implicit, here, is the Law of Likelihood). This can be done by way of a 
likelihood function. Furthermore, one might wish also to determine which hypothesis has the 
greatest likelihood in which case there exists maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) methods. The 
thesis with the greatest likelihood is the one best supported by the evidence.  
A simple likelihood function can be, without difficulty, defined under certain idealised conditions and 
assumptions28. Firstly, both observations of idiosyncrasies and convergences must occur within the 
same modal range. After all, evidence for or against contingency in some domain is irrelevant for 
evaluation of the ECT in another domain. Secondly, observations of idiosyncrasies and convergences 
                                                          
26 According to Sober (2008), this law also offers a “quantitative element” (Ibid.) that allows one to infer the 
degree of support O can offer H1 over H2. But this is extraneous to our current concerns here, especially given 
our present inability to quantify, exactly, the likelihoods. We can recognize only their directions of inequality. 
27 Due to the assumption of Evidential Weight, it is assumed that they the two observations push in opposite 
directions by the same amount. See trailing discussion. 
28 This is not to say that a likelihood function cannot be produced given unideal conditions. For example, even 
if individual observations were not mutually independent, one can just tediously calculate the joint probability 
of (x1, …, x(n) | θ) instead of individual terms P (xi|θ). Secondly, observations of idiosyncrasies and 
convergences are assumed to be one-dimensional here. If they are not, then we can code our observations 
according to d-dimensions. Thirdly, observations are taken to be binary in that they are either idiosyncratic or 
convergent, but it is sometimes suggested that convergences are spectral (Hall, 2007). If the real-world 
observations are not binary, then we can model using other distribution models such as a Gaussian instead of 
a Binomial distribution and employ probability density functions instead of probability mass functions. This 
allows us to differentiate between different degrees of idiosyncrasies and convergences. Regardless, there 
currently exists no good graded account of convergences and/or idiosyncrasies. All in all, in my binomial model 
here, I am assuming an idiosyncrasy-convergence dichotomy. If this assumption is false, then it is just that a 
different model would be appropriate. 
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must be commensurable. By this, I take it that, at least, idiosyncrasies and convergences must be 
specified at the same level of analysis and to the same scope of uniqueness. Recognising the 
convergence of coarse-grained trait like agricultural farming hardly counts against an idiosyncrasy 
about specific mechanisms of feeding structures. Thirdly, we might want to assume (for arithmetic 
simplicity, though we need not29) that idiosyncrasies and convergences have the same ‘evidential 
weight’ such that one observation of idiosyncrasies counts exactly against one instance of 
convergences, and vice versa. That is – the difference in likelihoods of the ECT and the RVL given 
idiosyncrasies, and the difference in likelihoods of the RVL and ECT are identical30:  
(Evidential Weight) Pr (IDIO|ECT) - Pr (IDIO|RVL) = Pr (CONV|RVL) – Pr (CONV|ECT)  
If Evidential Weight is true, then the ECT will raise the probability of any instance of idiosyncrasies by 
just the same amount as the RVL will raise the probability of any instance of convergences. In other 
words, idiosyncrasies and convergences push towards opposite sides by, exactly, the same amount. 
Fourthly, we assume mutual independence between all the observations. If these four conditions 
hold, then a binomial likelihood function can be defined to yield a likelihood distribution. Let us 
define this likelihood function by way of example.  
Suppose that some researchers were interested in the evolutionary contingency of the South 
American continent. They make a total of 100 observations that consists of 64 idiosyncrasies and 36 
convergences. If we understand the sequence of idiosyncrasies and convergences as a sequence of 
binary events, then modelling the data as a binomial distribution is appropriate since the 
observations are independent Bernoulli processes. Let the sequence of events serving as our data 
be: xi = {x1, …, X(n)}, whereby an idiosyncrasy is denoted by 1 and a convergence is denoted by 0. In 
our sample, the sequence might thus be coded as ‘1, 1, 0, 1, 0, … n’ such that total of 1’s is 64 and 
total of 0’s is 36. (Of course, there are many sequences in which the data contains 64 idiosyncrasies 
and 36 convergences; this is accounted for by the binomial coefficient of ‘n choose x’). The likelihood 
function for a binomial distribution is given by: 
Likelihood Function (Binomial Distribution):  
𝐿 (θ|𝑥) = (
𝑛
𝑥
) θ𝑥(1 − θ)𝑛−𝑥 
A binomial distribution has a single parameter, θ, which, in our running example, specifies the 
probability of the next observation being an idiosyncrasy given the data (i.e. Pr (Idio(n)|Data) = θ). 
And, naturally, the probability of the next observation being a convergence would be θC = 1- θ. In 
general, this likelihood function would generate a likelihood value for θ given a body of evidence 
consisting of some number of idiosyncrasies versus some number of convergences. Plugging in the 
values from the example yields: 
                                                          
29 The likelihood framework does not depend on the truth of this assumption. If the assumption were false 
such that observations of convergences and idiosyncrasies are weighted differently, then we would merely 
need to incorporate the right weighting. To this end, we can denote a ‘weighting ratio’ of idiosyncrasies versus 
convergences as LDi / LDc = y. If y=1, then the weightings of idiosyncrasies and convergences are the same (and 
Evidential Weight is true). If y < 1, then convergences are weighted heavier than idiosyncrasies. Accordingly, 
we can additionally take the product of y and the ratio of 
𝑥
𝑛
 to arrive at the θ with the maximum likelihood as 
to incorporate uneven weighting. There is, at present, no good argument for differential weighting of 
idiosyncrasies vs. convergences. So, I assume Evidential Weight. 
30 There is some debate over whether it is the ‘likelihood differences’, ‘likelihood ratios’ or some other 
measure that captures evidential weight (c.f. Eells & Fitelson, 2002). For my point here, it does not matter 
which is correct insofar as the evidential weight of idiosyncrasies and convergences are equal. 
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Likelihood Function (n=100, 64 idiosyncrasies, 36 convergences): 
𝐿 (θ|64) = (
100
64
) θ64(1 − θ)36 
This function outputs a likelihood for various θ’s ranging from 0 to 1. In other words, it tells us the 
likelihood of hypotheses that specify, from 0 to 1, the probability of next observation being an 
idiosyncrasy given the body of data. For example, the hypothesis that states that probability of the 
next observation being an idiosyncrasy (given the data) is 0.5 has the likelihood of 7.8861e-31. We 
can illustrate the function in the form of a graph: 
Diagram 2. Likelihood Distribution for 64 Idiosyncrasies and 36 Convergences 
But how does the value of θ relate to the degree of contingency? As mentioned, the value of θ 
specifies the probability that the next observation will be an idiosyncrasy given the data. For 
example, if θ=0.50, then there is a 50% probability that the next observation is an idiosyncrasy 
within the modal range. This is tantamount to saying that evolutionary contingency is true to a 
degree of 0.5. When the ECT is said to vary in degrees, it is meant that there are different levels of 
repeatability (or robustness) within a domain. So, if contingency were to reign absolutely supreme in 
some domain, then the probability of the next observation being an idiosyncrasy is 1.0 (and a 
convergence is 0) in domain. In other words, contingency is so strong in that domain that the 
probability of getting any idiosyncrasies is certain (and convergences is 0). A hypothesis with the θ of 
1.0 thus corresponds to an ECT hypothesis that specifies contingency to the maximum. We can 
denote the absolute ECT (the hypothesis on the far right of the spectrum with a θ of 1.0) as ECT(1.0). A 
milder ECT – say ECT(0.8) – would have a θ of 0.8 and the RVL would have a θ of 0. In general, then, 
the probability that the next observation is an idiosyncrasy given some ECT hypothesis is: for any n 
and θ, Pr (IDIO(n)|ECT(θ)) = θ. 
Given the likelihood function in our running example, we now have the likelihoods of various 
hypotheses and their corresponding evidential support by the data. However, how do we determine 
which hypothesis has the highest likelihood given the data? In order to determine the maximum 
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likelihood estimate, we need to find the derivative of the likelihood function with respect to θ and 
set it equal to 0. Accordingly, the maximum likelihood estimator is 
𝑥
𝑛
 (see appendix 1 for workings). 
So, the hypothesis with the maximum likelihood in the example is 
64
100
 = 0.64, and ECT(0.64) has the 
highest likelihood given the data (this result is also quite intuitive). In other words, the hypothesis 
that makes the data most probable is an ECT that specifies contingency to degree of 0.64. Now, of 
course, a different hypothesis – say ECT(0.22) – is also compatible with the data, but its likelihood 
would be significantly less than ECT(0.64). Comparatively speaking, given the Law of Likelihood, the 
body of evidence (i.e 64 idiosyncrasies and 36 convergence) evidentially favours ECT(0.64) over 
ECT(0.22). In fact, the data most evidentially supports ECT(0.64). 
Lastly, the likelihood function has the virtue of increased accuracy as there is more data. The 
likelihood profile will be ‘wide’ for small sample sizes but become increasingly ‘narrower’ as there is 
more data. And, as there is more data, one can increasingly be more confident in probabilistically 
ruling out certain hypotheses on account of their comparative likelihoods. In the diagram below, for 
example, as there is more data, the tail ends of the probability distribution become almost, 
probabilistically, impossible. 
Diagram 3. Wide vs. Narrow Likelihood Profiles 
As I see it, the likelihood function is quantitively powerful, but it is only just a modest claim about 
comparative likelihoods. It provides a means of evaluating hypotheses on the contingency spectrum 
given a single body of evidence and under certain conditions (as with any statistical model). So, 
whilst the likelihood function may be correct, one may still reject the ECT by denying that there are, 
in fact, any true instances of idiosyncrasies. Such a strategy does not challenge the likelihood model 
itself but challenges the inputs (i.e. the data) of the model. In this way, the model is only as good as 
the evidence – false observations will hinder the effectiveness of the model.  
Vermeij (2006), for example, severely doubts that there are true instances of unique evolution and 
attributes the purported singular evolution of 23 idiosyncrasies documented in the biological 
literature as due to ‘information loss over time’ (e.g. missing fossil data and the like). However, to be 
fair, Vermeij operates on an almost impossible standard of unique evolution. He requires that a 
trait’s evolution be singular in all time and all place. So, at best, Vermeij’s conclusion may be true of 
only an ECT that is indexed to all of time and space which is, plausibly, false. Contingency-theorists 
ought to count the number of idiosyncrasies, appropriately defined in their two dimensions, and 
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convergences in a particular domain to determine the truth of contingency in that domain. If there 
turns out to be no idiosyncrasies at all, but lots of convergences, there one has the answer to the 
contingency question.  
Secondly, it is important to be aware of what can be inferred from the likelihoods which is merely a 
tool for comparing hypotheses (i.e. ECT(θ)) given a single body of evidence and does not represent 
Pr(ECT(θ)) or Pr(ECT(θ)|IDIO ^ CONV). However, under a Bayesian framework, the likelihood ratio is 
equal to the Bayes factor (in favour of the ECT) and thus, is a component in the calculation of the 
conditional posterior probability. That is – one can take the product of the likelihood and the prior 
distribution to produce a posterior probability mass/density function for the ECT. Nonetheless, there 
would remain an issue of determining the prior probabilities – I leave this task and their century-long 
quibble to the Bayesians.  
6. Evolutionary Idiosyncrasies as Differential Evidence  
As established in section 4, idiosyncrasies undermine the robust view of life and support the ECT. 
However, evolutionary idiosyncrasies can differ in their degree of support for the ECT depending on 
certain statistical parameters revolving around their usage and a distinction between two different 
kinds of idiosyncrasies. Moreover, as mentioned at the outset, evolutionary idiosyncrasies can be 
defined and recognised according to two conceptual dimensions. An adjustment of either of these 
dimensions will shift idiosyncrasies’ evidential implications.  
Firstly, the statistical power of arguments invoking idiosyncrasies can vary. This can be illustrated by 
a numbers game: suppose there is a series of evolutionary scenarios (varying or identical scenarios) 
where an idiosyncrasy arose. That is – within the series of evolutionary scenarios, there is a 
particular form that evolved only once. It would seem then that the greater number evolutionary 
scenarios – or alternative histories – in which the idiosyncrasy could evolve, the greater the support 
for the ECT. The thrust of this claim is found in the fact that given so many opportunities for a 
particular form’s evolution, it evolved only once (where as the number of opportunities increases, 
the argumentative power increases). 
Take, for example, Lenski’s now infamous Long Term Evolutionary Experiment (LTEE). E. coli was 
known to metabolize only glucose as an energy source. However, when Lenski and his team grew 
twelve initially identical populations of E. coli, one of these populations soon evolved aerobic citrate 
usage (a peculiarity for E. coli with some microbiologists even going as far as deeming it contrary to 
the very definition of E. coli; e.g. Koser, 1924; Scheutz et al., 2005) at around the 30, 000 generation 
mark.  
However, one can imagine a qualitatively similar experiment to that of Lenski’s with the only 
difference being that instead of 12 identical populations, there were 12,000. If aerobic citrate usage 
still evolved only once despite a ten-thousand-fold increase in evolutionary opportunity, then this 
idiosyncrasy would have greater evidential strength for the ECT than an idiosyncrasy that arose from 
a lesser number of evolutionary opportunities (ceteris paribus). Thus, arguments from idiosyncrasies 
may do well to consider the number of alternative histories in which the idiosyncrasies could have 
evolved.  
This is particularly important given that there appears to be, within the literature, certain 
contingency questions that are associated with a ‘n=1’ sampling issue. By a sampling issue, I mean 
that due to inappropriate sample size or structure, certain inferences about wider-regularities simply 
cannot be made. For example, one type of contingency question may ask whether the same 
biological forms are expected to evolve under different nomological systems (e.g. Beatty, 1995). 
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That is – if the laws governing evolutionary dynamics were different, would the same forms still 
evolve? However, given that we are privy to the only one nomology of our actual world, it is difficult 
to observe the existence of idiosyncrasies and convergences in alternative nomological systems31 
and hence, certain contingency questions may be a statistical non-starter in this respect. In other 
words, a radically wide modal range such as one across nomological systems may be prone to the so-
called coverage error32.  
Secondly, a distinction can be made between two different kinds of idiosyncrasies: disparate 
idiosyncrasies (DPI) and divergent idiosyncrasies (DVI), whereby the latter has greater evidential 
strength for the ECT. In any modal range, divergent idiosyncrasies occur when two species share 
deep developmental homologues and yet arrive at distinct evolutionary outcomes of which at least 
one is uniquely evolved within the modal range. It demonstrates not only the unique evolution of an 
outcome but that evolutionary forces were sufficient to overcome phylogenetic and/or 
developmental constraints. In Lenski’s experiment, for example, the populations were initially 
identical and, as such, had presumably identical developmental generators. It can then be inferred 
that any idiosyncratic outcome is then a divergence from similar starting points in developmental 
space. Divergent evolution is similar to parallel evolution in that there are shared developmental 
resources, but unlike parallel evolution in that divergences result in different outcomes rather than 
same outcome.  
Disparate idiosyncrasies occur when two species with different developmental resources evolve 
distinct outcomes of which at least one is uniquely evolved. Disparate evolution is almost trivial in 
that it is not surprising that two different developmental starting points result in two different 
biological outcomes of which at least one is uniquely evolved within the modal range. It, however, 
serves as our contrast class to DVI.  
This distinction between the two kinds of idiosyncrasies mirrors the CE vs. PE distinction in that the 
division is based on whether there are shared developmental homologues (see Table 1). 
Interestingly, both distinctions attempt to tease apart two different sets of modalities: (i) the 
historical + nomological, and (ii) the merely nomological. That is – whereas genuine CE is the 
repetition of a form due solely to nomological considerations, PE is the result of both the historical 
and nomological33.  




Convergent Evolution Parallel Evolution 
Different Unique Outcome 
(‘Idiosyncrasies’) 
Disparate Idiosyncrasy Divergent Idiosyncrasy 
Table 1. Types of Independent and Dependent Evolution. 
                                                          
31 Some extrapolation about similar or nomologically-consistent systems may be possible but nonetheless 
difficult. 
32 The modal range may help in this respect by allowing the partitioning of a large series of evolutionary 
scenarios into individual lots of samples. 
33 Recall that one of the major criticisms propelled against ‘convergences’ by the likes of Currie (2012b), Pearce 
(2012), Powell (2012), Powell and Mariscal (2015) was that instances of PE fail to constitute truly independent 
alternative histories of life due to shared developmental homologues, and thus, instances of PE are 
nonetheless privy to the same historical constraints whereas genuine CE escaped historical constraints to 
demonstrate true independent convergence. In the terms of my present analysis, PE fails to demonstrate 
repeated evolution across evolutionary systems in the modal range. 
Page 22 of 24 
 
The distinction between divergent and disparate idiosyncrasies is meant to highlight the difference 
in the evidential role and strength that these idiosyncrasies play for the ECT. For instance, divergent 
idiosyncrasies answer adaptive hypotheses whilst disparate idiosyncrasies do not: instances of 
divergent idiosyncrasies show that phylogenetic constraints have been overcome since two species 
that were located closely in developmental space have now arrived at two different outcomes.  
The distinction also shows that divergent and disparate idiosyncrasies are accounted for by different 
explanations. An explanation of divergent idiosyncrasy would appeal to natural selection being weak 
or contingent. On the other hand, divergent idiosyncrasies cannot appeal to historicities since its 
outcome descended from the similar starting points. Similarly, the strength of natural selection 
would be an irrelevant explanation for cases of disparate evolution: when two species with different 
developmental generators arrive at distinct outcomes, the strength of natural selection (whether 
weak or strong) cannot be inferred. This is owing to the fact that both weak and strong natural 
selection is consistent with the result that disparate evolution occurred. In these ways, divergent 
and disparate idiosyncrasies are accounted for by different explanations.  
Thirdly, as previously mentioned, there are two conceptual dimensions in defining and recognising 
idiosyncrasies whereby an adjustment in any of these dimensions will result in a shift of 
idiosyncrasies’ evidential target. In the remainder of this section, I will explain how a contingency-
theorist can adjust these dimensions to suit their respective epistemic projects, so that any 
subsequently observed idiosyncrasy will be evidentially relevant to a particular contingency thesis of 
their concern.  
Recall that the scope of uniqueness refers to the range of conditions (e.g. time, geographical space, 
or, nomology) in which an idiosyncrasy can obtain. As such, observations of idiosyncrasies defined 
with a considerably narrow scope of uniqueness will inform only the evolutionarily contingent 
dynamics of a correspondingly narrow modal range. This is to say that idiosyncrasies are informative 
only of an evolutionary contingency thesis with a modal range index that corresponds to the scope of 
uniqueness. Hence, if an epistemic agent adjusts the scope of uniqueness that they take 
idiosyncrasies to have, then any such recognised idiosyncrasies are supportive of an ECT with a 
different modal range index. So, if a contingency-theorist were specifically interested in the body 
morphologies of aquatic, swimming creatures within our galaxy (e.g. McGhee, 2011), then they 
ought to look for uniquely evolved body morphologies within the right scope – namely, across all 
planets within the galaxy. Counting the number of idiosyncrasies with an ill-defined scope (say, of a 
different galaxy) will be evidentially mismatched.  
Similarly, adjusting the subject of idiosyncrasy will also shift the evidential target of idiosyncrasies. 
One way to adjust the subject of idiosyncrasy is to invoke a different grain of analysis. But to elect a 
particular level of grain and to count the idiosyncrasies present at that level is informative of only 
evolutionary contingency that occurs at that level. For example, suppose a contingency-theorist 
counted certain extremely, fine-grained idiosyncrasies such as specific colour patterns of mimicry. 
That is – they looked at all cases of mimicry within a modal range and considered whether there 
were uniquely evolved colour patterns. Some colour patterns might genuinely be non-contingent 
since there may be robust reasons for their occurrence such as their need to resemble certain 
universal patterns in nature. Others colour patterns might genuinely be idiosyncratic – a one-off 
evolutionary event due to some of the aforementioned explanations. However, at this level of 
analysis, such fine-grained observations would inform only contingency questions about the 
repeatability at the level of colour patterns and says nothing about the coarser-grained regularity of 
Batesian or Mullerian mimicry. That is – the grain of idiosyncrasies must also correspond to the grain 
of the evolutionary contingency thesis in question.  
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Conversely, having an extremely coarse-grained resolution of idiosyncrasies will not only entail that 
few idiosyncrasies will be found, but that any such observations of idiosyncrasies will be supportive 
of only an equally coarse-grained ECT. Take predator avoidance, for example. This trait – on account 
of its coarse-grained characterisation – is likely to be multiply realisable. That is – specific physiology 
conducive for quick getaways from lurking predators, camouflage coats to conceal oneself, or, high 
intelligence may be considered ‘predator avoidance’ all the same. So, it is unlikely that genuine 
idiosyncrasies can be found at the level of ‘predator avoidance’. However, if genuine idiosyncrasies 
can be found at this level, then it would be supportive of a specific contingency thesis and one that is 
rather strong (and interesting) – i.e. the thesis that ‘predator avoidance’ is evolutionarily contingent 
trait. My contrasting of fine-grained vs. coarse-grained resolutions is not to suggest that invoking 
certain levels of analysis are epistemically questionable endeavours, but merely that electing the 
grain of analysis is highly dependent on the epistemic agent’s interests since the grain of analysis is 
evidentially specific. So, when defining the grain of idiosyncrasy, consider the corresponding grain of 
the ECT that is of concern. 
But instead of merely adjusting the grain of a trait, suppose that the subject of idiosyncrasy was, 
now, a particular species. This would be informative of only the evolutionary contingency of species 
and not traits. That is – it answers contingency questions about whether species are likely to be 
repeatedly found. Losos’s (2017) recognition of the platypus as an idiosyncrasy may be a good 
example of recognising species to be the subject of idiosyncrasy. This is because the striking features 
of the platypus, such as the mammalian egg laying, are not, themselves, uniquely evolved. After all, 
it is widely known that the echidna are mammalian creatures that also lay eggs. However, the 
platypus, as a whole, with its full complement of traits may plausibly be uniquely evolved. If Losos is 
right such that the platypus qua species is an idiosyncrasy, then the platypus may be an 
evolutionarily contingent form, after all, though its traits may not. 
Like the scope of uniqueness, there must also be a match between the subject of idiosyncrasy and 
the subject of the ECT. Evolutionary contingency theses can differ in the subject that they take to be 
evolutionarily contingent. Theoretically, certain ECT’s refer to evolutionarily contingent traits whilst 
others can refer to evolutionarily contingent species, populations, etc. And so, in order for 
idiosyncrasies to be relevant to the contingency thesis in question, their subjects must correspond.  
7. Conclusion  
Despite the title of this paper, there is not the one evolutionary contingency thesis, but an infinite 
number as differentiated by its modal range, subject (including grain), and, then, its degree of 
strength. Whichever variant of the ECT is of concern is dependent on the epistemic agent’s interests 
and the full specifications of the thesis, but the evidence – whether idiosyncratic or convergent – 
ought to also have the corresponding dimensions in order to be empirically tractable for the thesis at 
hand.  
The concept of evolutionary idiosyncrasies, although previously overlooked, is crucial for making 
progress in the debate about evolutionary contingency. Not only do idiosyncrasies serve as evidence 
in support of evolutionary contingency, but they can be invoked in further analyses to be pitted 
against convergences in order to pinpoint the relative significance and/or strength of contingency in 
a particular domain. Additionally, explanations for their occurrences are informative of the way in 
which evolutionary dynamics have failed to robustly produce biological forms. Thus, to preclude a 
consideration of this newfound concept would be a detriment to any contingency-theorist who 
wishes to determine the truth of evolutionary contingency.  
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By way of ending, I should say that none of these audacious praises is to imply that their occurrences 
are a given for that is very much an empirical matter. Rather, the point is that the presence of 
idiosyncrasies, or lack thereof, in a modal range can be telling of the truth of contingency. If a 
thoroughly exhaustive search results in nil idiosyncrasies observed, then evolution might, after all, 
be truly robust and replicable… for a particular modal range, anyways. 
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Appendix 1. Deriving the Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
Binomial Likelihood Function: 
𝐿 (θ|𝑥) = (
𝑛
𝑥
) θ𝑥(1 − θ)𝑛−𝑥 
To find the maximum likelihood in a binomial distribution (when there are no saddles or 
minimum’s), set the derivative of the likelihood function with respect to θ to 0 (i.e. set the gradient 
to 0). However, it is quicker/easier to find dy/dx of the log of likelihood function which is: 
log 𝐿(θ|𝑥) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑛
𝑥
) + 𝑥 log θ + (𝑛 − 𝑥) log(1 − θ) 















Therefore, Maximum Likelihood Estimator: 
Max θ =  
𝑥
𝑛
 
 
 
